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CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE AND 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Larry Evans • 
Jarrell Wright • • 
Neal Devins • • • 
E ight years ago, a seemingly uneventful Supreme Court decision, Chevron, USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1 prompted a watershed debate over 
the role of administrative agencies in ascertaining legislative intent. In Chevron, a 
unanimous Supreme Court recognized broad agency power to interpret often 
ambiguous statutory language, holding that' 'permissible'' agency interpretations 
are controlling unless Congress has spoken to "the precise question at issue. " 2 
Counterbalancing this apparent elevation of agency interpretation at the expense 
of judicial interpretation, however, Chevron made clear that judicial analysis of 
legislative history is wholly appropriate in determining legislative intent: "If a 
court, employing traditional tools of statutory consideration, ascertains that Congress had 
an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must 
be given effect. " 3 
Chevron's recognition of a potentially broad judicial role likely explains the 
Court's unanimity. It also explains why, as Judge Patricia Wald observed in 
her analysis of post-Chevron decisionmaking, the Supreme C"ourt still relies on 
legislative history in many of its statutory construction cases. 4 Chevron has nonethe-
less caused a firestorm by suggesting that electorally accountable agencies take the 
lead in filling in the gaps left behind by the Congress rather than "[j]udges [who] 
• Associate Professor of Government, College of William and Mary. 
•• Associate, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, J.D., 1992, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 
College of William and Mary. 
••• Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary. 
1. 467 u.s. 837 (1984). 
2. !d. at 843 nn.9 & 11. 
3. ld. at 843 n.9 (emphasis added). 
4. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 
1988-89 Term of the United States Suprtml! Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 288 (1990). Chevron's invocation 
oflegislative history suggests that a result-oriented judge can easily work around the decision. William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 675 (1990); Antonin Scalia, judicial 
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520-21 (1989); R. Shep Melnick, 
Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 245, 252-53 (1992). Chevron, if anything, 
has prompted the D.C.·Circuit to make greater use of legislative history. See John F. Belcaster, The 
D. C. Circuit's Use of the Chevron Test: Constructing a Positive Theory of judicial Obedience and Disobedience, 
44 ADMIN. L. REV. 745 (1992). 
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are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the 
Government.' '5 This incendiary rhetoric prompted more .aw review articles than 
anyone would care to read in a lifetime6 and, more signific:mtly, has led the House 
and Senate Judiciary Committees to examine the Chevrou doctrine. 7 
The battleground over Chevron raises both fundamental talance-of-powers issues 
and more pedestrian concerns over what, if anything, can be learned by examining 
legislative history materials. The nuanced and detailed b<Jance-of-powers debate 
has thus far proven the focus of attention. The empirical debate, in contrast, often 
seems like a ''Yes You Can, No You Can't'' shouting match. This article considers 
an unexamined aspect of this empirical debate, namely, tlte critical role played by 
the internal procedures of Congress in shaping legislative output. Our purpose is 
to raise some previously unexamined issues about existing conceptualizations of 
legislative intent and to relate these issues to the controvt-rsy concerning Chevron. 
Although we raise more questions than we can answer witlt rigor, we believe that it 
is crucial for jurists and legal scholars to better incorporate tJ 1e richness and complex-
ity of the legislative process into their arguments about st ltutory interpretation. 
In this article we argue the following: A key aspect of the Chevron doctrine is the 
notion that courts can usually ascertain legislative intent, albeit with great difficulty. 
As often is the case with positions occupying the middle ground, the Chevron decision 
has drawn fire from two divergent sets of critics. One lined criticism (the "textual-
ist'' position) holds that courts cannot ascertain legislative tntent from nonstatutory 
sources. The textualists argue that the legislative process i:: too volatile and the con-
cept of legislative intent may be meaningless, absent clear directions in statutes. 
The other line of criticism (the ''traditionalist'' position) holds that Chevron actually 
underestimates the ability of judges to ascertain legislative intent from nonstatutory 
sources and that the Chevron doctrine induces courts to shirk their responsibility to 
fully scrutinize the actions of administrative agencies. 
This article, in contrast, argues that the' 'middle grounc ''approach of the Chevron 
doctrine reflects very well the practical exigencies of the kgislative process in Con-
gress. We base our argument on a richer notion oflegislltive intent than existing 
commentaries about Chevron. Specifically, we describe how congressional proce-
dures can influence and stabilize legislative outcomes. Wt reject radical critiques of 
nonstatutory interpretation such as that articulated by Justice Scalia. 8 However, 
we also demonstrate that the means through which congrc:ssional procedures shape 
legislative outcomes vary from issue to issue and over time, depending on a wide 
range of contextual factors. As a result, it is very difficult fc·r judges to make accurate 
5. 467 U.S. at 865. 
6. See, e.g., Russell C . Weaver, A Foolish Consistmcy is the Hobgobl'n of Little Minds, 44 BAYLOR L. 
REv. 592 ( 1992); Jerry L. Mashaw, TexiUillism, Constitutionalism, and I \e Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 
32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827 (1991); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Int .. -rpretation and the Balance of Power 
in the Administrative State, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 452 (1989); Alfred C. i•man, Jr., Administrative Law in 
a Global Era: Progress Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrativt Presidmcy, 73 CoRNELL L. REV. 
1101 (1988) . 
7. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, Hearin~ before the Subcomm. on the Courts 
of the Comm. on thejudiciary, IO!st Cong. , 2d Sess. (1990) . 
8. See infra notes 17-21. 
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predictions about how Congress would have acted when the relevant statutory lan-
guage is vague or nonexistent. In short, a greater sensitivity to the role of procedure 
in Congress supports the Chevron doctrine and points the way to a more empirically 
grounded conceptualization oflegislative intent in other areas of the law. 
We proceed in three phases. Section I is a descriptive summary of the debate 
over whether nonstatutory sources are useful or necessary for understanding con-
gressional intent. The relevance of congressional procedure to this debate is under-
scored. In Section II, the relevance of congressional procedure to this debate is 
emphasized and an empirical overview is provided of perhaps the most important 
aspect of congressional procedure: control over the agenda. Finally, in Section 
III we explore the significance of our argument for the debate over Chevron and 
existing conceptualizations of legislative intent. 
I. The Debate Over Legislative Intent 
The "ferment" surrounding Chevron has placed administrative agencies 
squarely in the middle of an increasingly furious cross-fire over the interpretation 
of federal statutes. 9 As noted previously, this debate has largely crystallized around 
the two central themes of Chevron: normative concerns about the constitutional 
balance of powers and the empirical question of what relationship legislative history 
actually bears to "legislative intent." Although the emergence ofthese two themes 
has resulted in a bifurcation of the debate, which has run its turbulent course in 
two relatively independent streams, the overall debate remains cohesive. The 
battle lines that have been drawn in the Chevron controversy have defined two 
distinct camps-roughly termed "textualist" and "traditionalist"-that retain 
their identity with regard to issues arising under each theme . 
A. BALANCE oF PowERs 
Chevron scholarship has placed inordinate emphasis on the balance-of-powers 
aspects of the decision. This focus can perhaps be best explained by the fact that 
the legal community is far more familiar and comfortable with the concepts and 
vocabulary underlying the balance-of-powers debate than with the concept of 
legislative history and the process of its production, a realm that has generally been 
left to the arena of political science. In any event , balance-of-powers issues played 
a critical role in the Chevron decision, and a discussion of the debate on this issue 
is necessary for a full understanding of the empirical issues. 
The textualist position. Textualists are not troubled by Chevron's apparent ele-
vation of the agency role over the judicial role when legislative intent is unclear . 
Rather, this camp argues that judicial consultation oflegislative history is inappro-
priate and leads to an imbalance of powers among the three branches of government. 
Although a statute is subjected to the constitutional requirements of bicameralism 
and presentment, the legislative history accompanying the statute is not. 10 As are-
9. &t Mashaw, supra note 6. 
10. Thompson u. Thompson, 484 U .S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); Puerto Rico Dept. 
of Consumer Affairs u. Isla Petroleum Corp. , 485 U .S. 495 , 501 (1988). 
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suit, legislative history cannot be said to have the force of11w in the strict constitu-
tional sense, and judicial reference to nonstatutory sources permits Congress to ex-
ert lawmaking authority in a manner beyond that contemplated by the 
Constitution. 11 Likewise, the role of the courts is to interpret the law, i.e., statutes, 
and not to decode the extra-legal documents comprising a statute's legislative his-
tory or to ''reconstruct legislators' intentions.' >1 2 Therefor•:, exhaustive judicial use 
oflegislative histories amounts to an abdication of the judiciary's constitutional role. 
Furthermore, textualists suggest that a paramount agency role actually affirms 
and strengthens traditional notions of separation of powers. Claiming that 
"statutory interpretation must not only avoid exces;es condemned by the 
Constitution, but should also be conducted 'in a fas.1ion which fosters that 
democratic process,' " 13 textualists argue that agencie; are better suited than 
courts to fill in gaps left open by Congress. 
The traditionalist position. Traditionalists argue thc.t judicial consultation of 
legislative history is consistent with the proper balance oJ'powers. Chevron's eleva-
tion of the agency role in statutory interpretation is viewed as an abdication of the 
judiciary's central responsibility to say "what the law is. " 14 Furthermore, the 
enlargement of executive power resulting from the displacement of judicial review 
by agency interpretation is a source of trouble to traditionalists. 15 Finally, tradition-
alists assert that Congress does not overstep its role wh~n it produces legislative 
history. The requirements of bicameralism and presentment only prevent Con-
gress from exercising veto authority over the executive. But these constitutional 
considerations do not render nonstatutory sources irrel~vant in determining the 
intent of Congress when it enacts measures pursuant to constitutional proce-
dures.16 
11. In other words, Congress must express its intent through statui ory language, or not at all. This 
formalistic argument was also used to invalidate the legislative veto m INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 
( 1983). If one house of Congress cannot dictate policy to the Preside 3t through a resolution that has 
not met the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, then it rray not dictate the interpretation 
of the law to the courts through the use ofunenacted legislative history. Kenneth W. Starr, Observations 
About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DuKE L.J. 371, 375. See also Wald, supra note 4, at 307. 
12. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 921, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. RE\'. 417, 419 (1899) ("We do not 
inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute m ~ans.' '). 
13. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 677 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413, 2424 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring)). 
14. William Eskridge uses the phrase "traditionalists." Eskridge, supra note 4. Cass Sunstein uses 
the phrase ''contextualists.'' Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in !he Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. 
REv. 407 (1989). Eskridge and Sunstein both emphasize judicial autonomy in criticizing Chevron. 
Eskridge, supra note 4, at 674; Sunstein, 103 HARV. L. REv. at 43·). 
15. See Farina, supra note 6. 
16. Eskridge, supra note 4, at 671-72 ("Consulting [committee rc:ports] does not violate bicamer-
alism or presentment any more than would consulting a dictionary.''). Indeed, it has been argued that 
textualism increases the likelihood that substantive results will be inconsistent with the desires of the 
elected branches as evidenced by compliance with the commands oi' bicameralism and presentment. 
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statute;: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of 
Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1314 (1990). 
Traditionalists, moreover, dispute textualists claim that judicial J·eliance on legislative history im-
properly expands legislative power. Traditionalists emphasize th<ct legislative history is produced 
publicly and that the President has an opportunity to review it in determining whether or not to sign 
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B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The key empirical differences between textualists and traditionalists regard the 
question of what-if anything-can be learned from an examination oflegislative 
history. This empirical question lies at the heart of Chevron. If legislative history 
is a reliable predictor of legislative purpose, courts should be more willing and 
more likely to find that Congress has spoken to' 'the precise question at issue.'' Put 
another way: Courts, not agencies, will define statutory purpose when Congress is 
found not to have left a gap in its statutory scheme. In contrast, iflegislative history 
is unreliable, courts should be more hesitant and less likely to find a specific 
congressional intent. Instead, courts should be more willing to validate' 'permissi-
ble" agency constructions of unclear legislation. Textualists and traditionalists 
offer fundamentally different appraisals of this empirical question. 
The textualist position. The textualist critique of Chevron argues that nonstatu-
tory sources like committee reports and agency interpretations are irrelevant in 
ascertaining legislative purpose. 17 By allowing a reviewing court to stray from 
statutory language to employ' 'traditional tools of statutory construction'' to ascer-
tain [c]ongressional intent "on the precise question at issue," 18 Chevron perpetu-
ates, rather than curtails, judicial reliance on untrustworthy sources. 19 Textualists 
argue that legislative history presents, at best, a distorted view of the legislature's 
intent, and, at worst, a counterfeit description of what the legislature actually had 
in mind when it voted on a statute. Predicating their arguments upon empirical 
assumptions of legislative behavior, specifically the manner in which legislators 
and their staffs generate a statute's legislative history, the textualists conclude that 
the statutory text is the most reliable source for discerning legislative will. 
Textualists suggest that legislative history is not necessarily representative of the 
true preferences of the legislature. 2° Committee reports, the most frequently cited 
sources of congressional intent, are not written by the legislators themselves, but 
rather by their staffs. 21 Compounding this lack of direct involvement is the fact that 
members of Congress often have only superficial familiarity with the contents of 
committee reports and other nonstatutory sources of information, such as floor debates 
a bill into law. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION 92 (1991); Daniel A. Farber & PhilipP. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 
VA. L. REV. 423, 457 (1988). 
17. The most visible textualist is Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. For Scalia's explication 
of his position, see Scalia, supra note 4. For assessments of Scalia, see Eskridge, supra note 4; Arthur 
Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always 
Loses, 1990 DuKE L.J. 160. 
18. Chevron, 467 U.S. 843, 847 n.9. 
19. This is the basis of Justice Scalia's criticism of the majority opinion in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
480 U.S. 421, 454-55 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
20. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,610 (1987) (Scalia,J., dissenting); REED DICK· 
ERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975). 
21. Justice Scalia has quoted at length from an actual exchange on the Senate floor supporting the 
assertion that the legislators themselves are seldom actively involved in the drafting of committee 
reports. See Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 8 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 128 CoNe. REc. S8659 (daily ed. July 19, 1982)). For a critique of 
this assertion, see Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, supra note 16. 
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and hearings. 22 Indeed, committee reports are seldom read by legislators and are 
never subjected to an up or down vote. Therefore, the statutory text-the only source 
that was subject to the immediate approval or disapproval of legislators-provides the 
only reliable indication of what most members intended \\hen they voted. 23 
Not only do textualists contend that legislative historr is a poor reflection of 
legislative intent, they also argue that it can be deliberately skewed in order to 
influence subsequent judicial interpretation. Members of Congress frequently 
engineer floor debates that are not designed to persuade or inform their colleagues. 
Rather, these exchanges are targeted for a judicial audience, which will later 
examine these debates to gauge what the institution itself actually "intended" 
when it enacted the legislation. 24 Senate debate on major civil rights legislation in 
1991 illustrates the potential for strategic manipulation of legislative history. With 
an eye to influencing future court action, Democrats aad Republicans, during 
floor debate, articulated highly different interpretations o:' the standards regarding 
what constitutes "business necessity" in hiring decisions The lawmakers eventu-
ally had to place a three-paragraph memo in the Congressi mal Record to serve as the 
"exclusive legislative history. " 25 Such inclusions in the record are relatively rare, 
however, and textualists argue that the strategic manipulation oflegislative history 
typically goes unnoticed and unchallenged. 
Congressional staffers, according to the textualists, are even more prone to 
committing this offense than are their employers. The minimal involvement of 
legislators in the process of drafting report language pl.iCes heavy responsibility 
on their staffs, who actually prepare the committee reports. Because of the intense 
scrutiny such reports are subjected to in the courts, there is incentive for staffers 
to load these sources . 26 An overzealous staff member, or • me susceptible to interest 
group influence, may find it both tempting and uncomplicated to pack the commit-
tee report with information that, if later relied upon by courts, would effectively 
change the meaning of the statute Congress actually en acted. 27 As Justice Scalia 
has argued: "What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that 
22. Hirschey, 777 F.2dat 7 (Scalia,]., concurring)("! frankly doubt t 1atit iseverreasonabletoassume 
that the details, as opposed to the broad outlines of purpose, set forth i11 a committee report come to the 
attention of, much less are approved by, the house which enacts the committee's bill.''); Green v. Bock 
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U .S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia , ] ., concurring) ("I find no reason to believe 
that any more than a handful of the Members of Congress ... (if ar. y) voted ... on the basis of the 
referenced statements in the Subcommittee, Committee, or Confere11ce Committee Reports, or floor 
debates."). See also Zeppos, supra note 16, at 1310. 
23. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29 (1989)(Sca tia,J., concurring in part); Reed 
Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1125, 1130 (1983). 
24. See WilliamS. Moorhead, A Congressman Looks at the Planned Coli< quy and Its Effect in the Interpretation 
of Statutes, 45 A.B.A. J . 1314 (1959). 
25. Joan Biskupic, Skirmish Over Spin, CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3204, Nov. 2, 1991. 
26. "[The) routine deference to the detail of committee reports, and the predictable expansion in 
that detail which routine deference has produced, are converting a sy;tem of judicial construction into 
a system of committee-staff prescription." Hirschey, 777 F.2d at 8 (Scalia, J., concurring). See generally 
Starr, supra note II; Zeppos, supra note 16; Melnick, supra note 4; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chlvron and 
its Aftermath: judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisim s, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988). 
27. American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1192 n .: :2 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Hirschey v. 
FERC, 777 F.2d I, 7·8 (D.C . Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J . , concurring); f~ichard J. Pierce, Jr. , Thl Role of 
the judiciary in Implementing an Agency Thlory of Government, 64 N.Y.tr. L. REv. 1239, 1258 (1989). 
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his or her citation of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law 
of the land, thereafter dutifully to be observed by the Supreme Court itself.' ' 28 
The traditionalist position. Traditionalists take issue with the textualist asser-
tion that legislative history is fundamentally unreliable. In defending the reliability 
of legislative history, traditionalists have challenged the empirical assumptions 
supporting reliance on the text alone. According to advocates oflegislative history, 
the textualist view of the legislative process is' 'jaundiced'' and overly pessimistic, 29 
reflecting a narrow view of ''legislators at their worst.' ' 30 
Traditionalists argue that members of Congress not only are familiar with the 
information in committee reports, but in many cases are familiar with little else. 31 
Anecdotes about congressmen who fail to read the statutes they vote on are legion. 
Legislators look to committee reports for voting cues and rely on the information they 
provide. As a result, traditionalists maintain that committee reports are a credible 
source for determining what the intent of Congress was when the bill was enacted. 32 
Traditionalists also present an array of arguments that the legislative process does 
not result in active misrepresentation of congressional intent. They accuse Scalia and 
others of ascribing too much power, too few constraints, and too few scruples to 
congressional staffers and interest groups. Staffers are not potential renegades pursu-
ing their own personal agendas in the legislative process; substantial evidence demon-
strates that they generally adhere to the preferences of their elected employers. 33 
And even if the textualist position is correct and the staff system is susceptible 
to abuse, then this is simply an argument for cautious and thoughtful use of 
nonstatutory sources rather than a basis for entirely disregarding legislative his-
tory. 34 Indeed, the delegation of power to congressional staff is part of a larger 
system that is supported by the elected representatives and thus reflects the way 
Congress prefers to operate. 35 And because committee reports are central to the 
28. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
29. FARBER & FRICKEY, LAw AND PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 16, at 95; Eskridge, supra note 4, at 
679-81. 
30. Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, supra note 16, at 437. 
31. FARBER & FRICKEY, LAw AND PuBLIC CHOICE, supra note 16, at 98; ERIC REDMAN, THE DANCE 
OF LEGISLATION 140 (1973); Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, supra note 16, at 445. 
32. See RICHARD PosNER, THE FEDERAL CouRTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 269-70 (1985). 
33. See George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliability 
of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DuKE L.J. 39, 67; Farber 
& Frickey, Legislative Intent & Public Choice, supra note 16, at 425-3 7. Traditionalists also note that staff 
members are as closely involved with the drafting of the statutory text as they are with the drafting 
of committee reports. Zeppos, supra note 16, at 1312-13. 
34. FARBER & FRICKEY, LAw AND PuBLIC CHOICE, supra note 16, at 99; Farber & Frickey, Legislative 
Intent and Public Choice, supra note 16, at 448; Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: 
The Case for a Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 TuLANE L. REv. 1, 24 (1988). See also William N. 
Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Jr., Statutory Intepretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN L. REv. 321, 353 
(1989) (a model of interpretation based on relative reliability of intrinsic and extrinsic sources); Zeppos, 
supra note 16, at 1323 (statutory text, as well as legislative history, is subject to manipulation). 
35. FARBER & FRICKEY, LAw AND PuBLIC CHOICE, supra note 16, at 98-99 ("What [the role of 
committee stall] should be is, however, surely the primary concern of the legislative rather than the 
judicial branch."); Costello, supra note 33, at 66-67; Wald, supra note 4, at 306-07 ("[t]o disregard 
committee reports as indicators of congressional understanding ... is to second-guess Congress' 
chosen form of organization and delegation of authority, and to doubt its ability to oversee its own 
constitutional functions effectively.") 
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judicial interpretation of statutes, there is little possibility that interest groups or 
staffers would be able to egregiously slant reports without the knowledge of other 
factions, who have strong incentives to monitor the drafting process. 36 
Traditionalists not only defend the value of nonstatutory sources as a general 
proposition, but also argue that consultation oflegislative history can prove useful 
in virtually all circumstances, including those where it is not directly on point. 
When a statute and its legislative history fail to confront an issue that confounds 
subsequent interpreters, a judge should choose the interpretation that ( 1) most 
likely reflects the wishes of the enacting legislature and ( 2) is the most beneficial 
reading of the statute. 37 Under this approach to statutory interpretation, "[t]he 
characterization of legislative purpose is an act of crea:ion rather than discov-
ery.' ' 38 This technique has been defended on the grounc.s that direct evidence of 
legislative intent on any given issue is rarely available. 39 ,\ccordingly, traditional-
ists argue that Chevron's emphasis on evidence that is direc :lyon point misconstrues 
the fundamental nature of statutory interpretation. 40 
* • * * * * 
In short, the dominant contenders in the contemporary debate over statutory 
interpretation can be considered extremes on a continuum. Textualists reject both 
the credibility and the legitimacy of legislative history i:1 illuminating legislative 
intent. Some even question the fundamental concept of a coherent legislative 
intent. 41 Traditionalists, in contrast, not only defend t1e value of nonstatutory 
sources as a general proposition, but also argue that consultation of legislative 
history can prove useful in virtually all circumstances, including those where it is 
not directly on point. The Chevron formulation lies somt:where close to the center 
of this continuum. Although recognizing that nonstatutory sources can facilitate 
an interpreter's task, Chevron refuses to credit nongermane legislative history with 
persuasive force. 
36. Costello, supra note 33, at 67 ("(T]he possibility of appending mdividual views to a committee 
report serves both as leverage and as a safety valve against committ• :e reports that do not represent 
accurately the views of a committee majority."). 
37. FARBER & FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 16, at J 02-06. In other words, the court 
"must take into account both the odds of being right and the consequences of being wrong." /d. at 
103. For similar formulations, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note ::3, at 329-30 (1990) ("(W]here 
Congress has written a statute broadly or where its concerns do not aJJ, lW us to reconstruct its imagined 
intent, courts should simply seek the most reasonable interpretation.''). PosNER, supra note 32, at 287 
(''[A] judge must imagine as best he can how the legislators who enact< d the statute would have wanted 
it applied to situations they did not foresee."). 
38. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 427. 
39. See Peter C. Schanck, The On(y Game in Town: An Introductwn to Interpretive Theory, Statutory 
Construction, and Legislative Histories, 38 KAN. L. REv. 815, 819 (1990); DICKERSON, supra note 20 at 154. 
40. See Kenneth W. Starret al. ,judicial Review of Administrative Actio:! in the Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. 
L. REv. 353, 368-69 (1987) ("Statutory construction is not a search for direct decision of precise 
questions.''); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative i 'upremacy, 78 Gw. L.J. 281, 286 
( 1989) (' '[T]he same considerations that make language and intent b: nding when they are clear entitle 
them to judicial attention when they are unclear."); Frank H. East:rbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 533, 551 (1983). 
41. Easterbrook, supra note 40, at 545-48. 
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Therefore, each side in the debate has sought not only to undermine the contenti-
ons of its counterpart, but also to argue convincingly that the current state of the 
law should be modified to reflect its own positions. One relevant issue yet to be 
considered is how the internal procedures of Congress make legislative history 
more or less predictable. For example, if party and committee leaders wield enough 
power to consistently control legislative outcomes, leadership-produced legislative 
history-as traditionalists argue-would be an accurate measure of legislative 
purpose. In contrast, if the significance of leadership preferences are not predict-
able, leadership-produced legislative history-as textualists claim-would be inde-
terminate. The following section will examine a central aspect of procedure in 
Congress-agenda control-so that we can better evaluate the reliability of non-
statutory sources as indicators of legislative intent. 
II. Agenda Control and Legislative Intent 
By all accounts, the internal procedures of Congress are relevant. For purposes 
of analysis, procedure is defined in this study as any formal rule or precedent that 
sets jurisdiction, the distribution of legislative resources, the range of admissible 
policy alternatives, the order of consideration, or the manner in which policy 
disagreements are to be resolved. 42 Agenda prerogatives, which pertain to the 
range of admissible alternatives and the order of consideration, are perhaps the 
most significant subset of congressional procedure. 
Congressional procedure is crucial because it influences the processes through 
which the policy preferences of individual legislators are aggregated into policy 
outcomes. Consider the reauthorization of the Clean Air Act, one of the most 
volatile items on the congressional agenda during the 1980s. 43 Efforts to reautho-
rize the program failed on the floor of the Senate in 1988, but legislation was passed 
in the Senate in 1990. In this case, as in many others, the outcome was determined 
by who controlled the agenda. The two key players in the Senate were George 
Mitchell (Dem.-Maine) and Robert Byrd (Dem.-West Virginia), with Mitchell a 
vocal advocate of tighter acid rain controls and Byrd a staunch opponent because 
of the likely impact on West Virginia's coal-intensive economy. During the tOOth 
Congress (1987-88), Mitchell chaired the subcommittee on jurisdiction and led 
the fight to reauthorize the Clean Air Act. But Byrd, as majority leader, controlled 
scheduling on the Senate floor, and he was successful in blocking final passage of 
the reauthorization in 1988.44 At the beginning of the lOlst Congress, however, 
Byrd stepped aside as majority leader-and was replaced by George Mitchell. The 
Clean Air Act was successfully reauthorized within two years. 45 
As this example suggests, congressional procedure is seldom neutral. The inter-
42. On the general importance of procedure in Congress, see TERRY SuLLIVAN, PROCEDURAL STRUC-
TURE: SUCCESS AND INFLUENCES IN CONGRESS (1984). 
43. An in-depth description is provided in RICHARD E. CoHEN, WASHINGTON AT WoRK: BAcK 
RooMs AND CLEAN AIR (1992). 
44. !d. at 36-44. 
45. /d. at 81-98. 
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nal structure of Congress affects the substance of policy ou :comes because it creates 
an uneven distribution of power in the institution-part:! leaders and committee 
chairs, for example, often have distinct policy-making ad,rantages over their rank-
in-file colleagues. To a certain extent, the rules and institutions of the Congress 
simply embody and promote a division of labor that enhances the institution's 
efficiency. 46 But they also reflect trading off between diff ~rent legislators, or what 
has been termed an "institutionalized logroll:" legislatcrs have disproportionate 
resources in the issue areas they care the most about. 47 
It should be emphasized, however, that congressional structure is fundamentally 
majoritarian, even if its policy implications are seldom n'!utral. 48 Under Article I, 
§ 5 of the U.S . Constitution, the members of the House md Senate organize their 
respective chambers, and the rules, procedures, and institutions of each chamber 
can be altered by a majority of the relevant membershii'· Consequently, congres-
sional structures can be conceptualized as "congealed preferences. " 49 And policy 
outcomes in Congress depend on both issue-specific pn ferences about policy and 
these less transitory preferences about structure . . 
Although the importance of procedural rules in Congress is widely recognized, 
the implications for statutory interpretation have not b!en adequately addressed. 
Judges and legislators instead tend to focus on preferences-on the policy views 
of key legislators. However, because the language in .1 statute is determined by 
the views of legislators combined with the procedures thr )ugh which such views are 
aggregated, the concept oflegislative intent should embrace both preferences and 
procedures. Individual policy preferences are relativel) meaningless until they are 
combined within the legislative process and translated into law, and the internal 
institutional arrangements that Congress has developed structure this process 
of preference aggregation. Therefore, even if it is possible to discern subjective 
individual preferel\ces about unresolved policy issues, chis is not enough to predict 
how Congress as a whole would have settled the question. In order to reconstruct 
''legislative intent,'' a determination must be made )f how the internal mecha-
nisms of Congress would have channeled those prefere 1ces into a statutory format. 
The political science literature on congressional pr,>eedure is massive, but it is 
apparent that the linkages between policy preference~, procedural arrangements, 
and legislative outcomes can be subtle and dynamic , often evading efforts at precise 
quantification and prediction. Many related factors influence how individual pref-
46. See, e. g. , Joseph Cooper, Congress in Organizational Ptrspectil e, in CoNGRESS RECONSIDERED 140 
(Lawrence C . Dodd & Bruce j. Oppenheimer eds., 1977); KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGIS· 
LATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991). 
4 7. The literature in this area is vast. On the institutionalized logroll as it pertains to agricultural 
policy, see john Ferejohn, Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp Legislation, i11 
CoNGRESS AND PoLICY CHANGE 223 (Gerald C. Wright, Jr. et al. eds., 1986). More generally, see 
DAVID R. MAYHEW, CoNGREss: THE ELECTORAL CoNNECTION (19' 14); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional 
Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions, in PoLITICAL SciENCE: T" E SCIENCE OF PoLITICS 51 (Herbert 
F. Weisberg ed . , 1986); Barry M. Weingast & William J. M:.rshall, The Industrial Organization ~~ 
Congress, 96 J . PoL. EcoN. 132 (1988). 
48. See KREHBIEL, supra note 46. 
49. &e gentrally William H. Riker, Implications from the Disequi !fbrium of MaJority Rule for tht Study <if 
Institutions, 74 AM . PoL. Sc1. REv. 432 (1980) . 
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erences are assembled into laws. As a result, judicial interpreters cannot rely on 
a general principle that will enable them to decipher reliably the "intent" of the 
legislature with respect to unresolved issues. The internal structural characteristics 
of Congress can confound judicial attempts to reconstruct legislative intent when 
statutes are ambiguous or incomplete. 
A complete accounting of the implications of congressional procedure for judicial 
efforts at discerning legislative intent is well beyond the scope of a single article. 
As a result, in this section we focus on a central aspect of congressional procedure-
the distribution of agenda prerogatives, although most of our arguments can be 
extended to congressional structure in general. 
A. AGENDA PREROGATIVES 
As mentioned, "agenda control" refers to actions that influence which policy 
alternatives are considered and the order in which they are considered. Manipula-
tion of the agenda can directly influence policy outcomes, but, as is the case 
more generally with political power in Congress, the power to manipulate the 
institution's agenda is remarkably decentralized. No single individual or institu-
tion in Congress possesses the power to control the agenda at every stage in the 
legislative process. And because each chamber of Congress sets its own rules, the 
distribution of agenda prerogatives in each is different. 
Even a cursory overview of lawmaking in Congress demonstrates the extent to 
which agenda prerogatives are widely dispersed. The first stage in the cycle of 
legislation is referral. In the House of Representatives, the Parliamentarian, work-
ing with the Speaker, refers newly introduced legislation to one or more issue-
specific committees, and party leaders perform the same function in the Senate. 
Depending on the jurisdictional boundaries of the committees and the subject of 
the proposed legislation, a bill may be referred to a single committee, to two or 
more committees simultaneously, or to two or more committees sequentially. 50 
Referral decisions in the Senate are more informal, with party leaders playing key 
roles. But in both chambers of Congress, the decision about how, where, and when 
to refer legislation (a form of agenda control) is highly significant because most 
legislative work occurs in committee, and the action a committee takes on a bill 
often determines its ultimate fate. 51 
The nature of the committee referral process decentralizes the agenda-setting 
function in Congress. Standing committees in the House and Senate have fixed 
jurisdictions, which are formally denoted in House Rule X and Senate Rule XXV. 
Jurisdictional alignments in the House and Senate are similar, but not identical, 
50. Although legislation is usually referred to standing committees of the House, on particularly 
complex items the Speaker has the power to form an ad hoc committee constituted for that legislation 
alone. 
51. For example, the 1964 Civil Rights Act was referred to the House judiciary Committee and the 
Senate Commerce Committee. Why the difference? At the time, the chairs of the House Commerce and 
Senate Judiciary Committees were staunch opponents of civil rights, and, as a result, moving the 
legislation through these alternate panels kept it from being killed in committee and improved the 
chances of passing the legislation. See WALTER j. 0LESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE 
POLICY PROCESS 86-87 (3d ed. 1989). 
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and they correspond roughly to the organization of the various executive depart-
ments. 52 However, major issues often fall within the jurisdiction of more than one . 
panel-thus the need for the referral of legislation to multiple committees. 
There are countless examples of overlapping committee jurisdictions in Con-
gress. Immigration legislation, for instance, although prin 1arily within the jurisdic-
tion of the House judiciary Committee, has also been referred to the Committees 
on Agriculture and Education and Labor. 53 Twelve Home committees have some 
jurisdiction over environmental issues. 54 During the 19:30s, the issue of nuclear 
waste disposal was claimed by the House Committees on Energy and Commerce, 
Science and Technology, and Interior and Insular Affairs, among others. In the 
Senate, legislation to authorize the Superfund program has been considered by 
the Committees on Environment and Public Works, Finance, and Judiciary. 
Trade issues are rife with jurisdictional overlaps. Durmg the lOOth Congress, 
for example, fourteen House committees and nine St nate committees shared 
jurisdiction over one major trade bill .55 
Jurisdictional overlaps and the mounting complexity of many pressing policy 
concerns have resulted in a steady increase in bills referred to more than one 
committee of the House and Senate. Indeed, the percer.tage of multiple referrals 
in the House has grown from just 6 percent in the 94t'1 Congress to 14 percent 
in the 99th Congress. With major legislation, the incidence of multiple referral is 
even higher. 56 Since the congressional agenda is largely set in committee, on many 
measures jurisdictional overlaps and the practice of mdtiple referral combine to 
ensure that a wide range of actors in both chambers can exert agenda control at 
this crucial stage of the legislative process. 
After referral to the relevant committee or committet:s, initial legislative action 
begins with the scheduling of hearings and, later, with bill writing sessions (called 
markups) where amendments are introduced and vote:; are cast. Agenda control 
is important at this stage in the process because a bill that does not receive a place 
on the committee's agenda is a bill that probably will not pass. For instance, a 
committee leader who dislikes a measure may refuse tc schedule it for committee 
consideration . Alternatively, he may postpone conside: .·ation indefinitely in order 
to preclude the bill's passage57 or may delay scheduling until valuable concessions 
regarding the bill's substantive content are received. F articularly toward the end 
of a session, even short delays can mean defeat for a r•iece of legislation. Once a 
52 . CHARLES TtEFER, CoNGREssiONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE : A REFERENCE, RESEARCH, AND 
LEGISLATIVE GuiDE 71 (1989). 
53. ld. at 72. 
54. See RoGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER]. 0LESZEK, CoNGRESS AND ITs MEMBERS 212 (3d ed. 1990). 
55. See id. at 213 . 
56. On the incidence of multiple referrals, consult Roger H. Davidson et al., One Bill, Many Commit-
tees: Multiple Referrals in the U.S. House of Representatives, 13 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 3 (1988); Melissa P. Collie 
& Joseph Cooper, Multiple Referrals and the "New" Committee Syste n in the House of Representatives, in 
CoNGRESS RECONSIDERED 245 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce] . O~penheimer eds., 4th ed. 1989). 
57. Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Changing Time Constraints in Congress : Historical Perspectives on the Use of 
Cloture, in CoNGRESS RECONSIDERED 343 (Lawrence C . Dodd & BJUce J. Oppenheimer eds. , 3d ed. 
1985). See also 0LESZEK, suprf! note 51; C . LAWRENCE EvANS, LEADERSHIP IN CoMMITTEE (1991) . 
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bill is placed before the panel, the chairman controls the gavel, and thus retains 
significant authority over the pace, order, and content oflegislative business. For 
example, observers of the House Energy and Commerce Committee regularly 
comment on how quickly Chairman john Dingell's (Dem.-Michigan) gavel can 
fall when he opposes an amendment or a procedural motion. 58 
As with referral powers, the distribution of agenda prerogatives in committees 
varies between chambers. In the House of Representatives, initial committee 
action tends to occur in an issue-specific subcommittee, while the smaller and more 
collegial Senate finds it more practical to manage business in full committee. 59 As 
a result, legislation in the House must pass through two levels of agenda control 
procedures-one in subcommittee and one in the full committee-while most 
critical decisions in Senate committees are made at the full committee level. 
Although full committee and subcommittee chairmen have extensive power to 
control the flow of business in their panels, other committee members can avail 
themselves of procedures to dislodge an item that has been stalled by the leadership. 
There can be significant practical consequences and political costs to overruling 
a committee leader who, after all, has the power to make future decisions that 
may undermine a dissident member's interests and give him cause to regret his 
rebellion. Such mechanisms are, therefore, rarely used, but they remain available 
for high salience issues and their potential impact cannot be overlooked. 
Following completion of committee action, legislation moves to the floor, where 
it is also subject to the perils of the agenda. The impact of agenda control on floor 
deliberations is more profound in the House than the Senate. For measures in the 
House that cannot be assigned to the Consent Calendar or passed quickly by suspen-
sion of the rules, 60 the House Rules Committee provides a resolution, or ''rule,'' 
that sets the terms of floor consideration. 61 Although the contents of these resolu-
tions vary from bill to bill, they typically control the time-limits on debate, the 
distribution of floor time to individual members, the number and types of amend-
ments that will be allowed, the order in which these amendments will be consid-
ered, and the quantity of floor time allocated to each amendment. Nongermane 
amendments usually are not permitted. 
Although the Rules Committee has formal control over the agenda for floor 
deliberations in the House, the Speaker exerts considerable influence over what 
gets scheduled and the terms of debate. Since 1975, the Speaker has nominated 
58. See, e.g., David Maraniss, Powerful Energy Panel Turns on Big John's Axis, WAsH. PosT, May 15, 
1983, at AI. 
59. Relative to the House, subcommittee markups are less common in the Senate due to greater 
demands on the time of individual senators. The Senate's policy agenda is similar in size to that of 
the House, but the Senate has less than one fourth the membership. As a result, Senate committees 
often remove one stage, the subcommittee markup, from the process to conserve member time. See 
generally, STEVENS. SMITH 11< CHRISTOPHER]. DEERING, CoMMITTEES IN CoNGRESS (2d ed. 1990); EvANS, 
supra note 57, 73-105. 
60. The Consent Calendar and suspension of the rules are procedures employed on noncontroversial 
measures. 
61. A useful summary of House floor procedure is provided in 0LESZEK, supra note 51, at chs. 5, 
6. For recent changes, consult STANLEY BAGH & STEVEN S. SMITH, MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ADAPTATION AND INNOVATION IN SPECIAL RULES (1988). 
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all majority party members of the Rules Committee, subject to approval by the 
Democratic Caucus. As a result, the panel is often described as an ''arm of the 
leadership" and usually promotes the Speaker's interests 62 House "rules" inevi-
tably affect the nature of the substantive outcomes of tht: legislative process. For 
example, rules can be tailored to the specific purpose of g~tting a measure bogged 
down in unpopular amendments or can streamline the process of consideration so 
that passage of the bill is expedited. 63 
Relative to the House floor, agenda prerogatives on the floor of the Senate are 
widely dispersed. There is no formal analog to the House Rules Committee in the 
Senate. 64 Most Senate business is conducted by unanimous consent because the 
formal rules of the institution are relatively cumbersome. 65 When legislation is 
brought to the Senate floor, a member, typically the m:tjority leader, stands up 
on the floor and requests action on an item by unanill}Olls consent. If no senator 
objects, the motion carries. As a result, individual senat•Jrs have enormous influ-
ence over the pace and direction of floor action in their institution. By systemati-
cally objecting to requests for unanimous consent, a senlltor can often block items 
he or she opposes. Indeed, a member can bring the institution to a grinding halt. 66 
These procedural prerogatives of individual senators are rooted in the filibuster, 
which is the central weapon in a senator's procedural arsenal. 67 By extending 
debate, introducing scores of amendments, or repeated!~' requesting quorum calls 
and roll call votes, a senator can block floor action on a piece of legislation. Of 
course, a filibuster can be curtailed by invoking cloture, but this requires 60 votes, 
as well as considerable time and effort. As a result, particularly toward the end 
of a session or as a recess approaches, the mere threat of a filibuster can be sufficient 
to derail a measure. 
• • • • • • • • • • 
In summary, the potential for agenda control prerog<·.tives to play a central and 
often determinative role is manifest at all stages of the legislative process in both 
the House and Senate. However, the exact manner in which these prerogatives 
influence the legislative process varies by chamber anc1 stage of the process, and 
62. Bruce I. Oppenheimer, The Rules Committee: New Ann of Leaiership in a Decentralized House, in 
CoNGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 57. 
63. BACH & SMITH, supra note 61. 
64. Unlike the House Rules Committee, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration is 
essentially an administrative panel, with jurisdiction over matters such as committee funding and 
campaign finance reform. The Senate Rules Committee is not respor sible for structuring floor debate . 
65. For discussions of unanimous consent agreements in the Senotte, consult R . Keith, "The Use 
of Unanimous Consent in the Senate," in Committees and Senate Proctt!ures, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 1977, 
140-68; 0LESZEK, supra note 51, at 177-238; STEVENS. SMITH, CAlL To ORDER: FLOOR PoLITICS IN 
THE HoUSE AND SENATE 86-129 (1989). See a/so BARBARA SINCLAII:, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES SENATE (1989). 
66. The collegial nature of the Senate deters individual member; from asserting this prerogative, 
i.e., "go along to get along." However, the infrequency with whicl , the prerogative is exercised does 
not change the fact that it is available and is used . 
67. The last in-depth analysis of the Senate filibuster was pro~ided by FRANKLIN L. BuRDETTE, 
FILIBUSTERING IN THE SENATE (1940). For recent trends, consult]. Calmes, Trivialized Filibuster Is Still 
A Potent Tool, CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP., Sept. 5, 1987, at 2115-20; SINCLAIR, supra note 65. 
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generalization is difficult. The power to manipulate the agenda is dispersed, partic-
ularly in the Senate. Furthermore, many opportunities exist for legislators to 
counter agenda control efforts by their colleagues in and out of the leadership. The 
following two cases illustrate the problems presented by the nature of agenda 
prerogatives in Congress for those seeking to reconstruct legislative intent. 
B. CASE STUDIES68 
Agenda Control in Committee. The first case study pertains to the potential impor-
tance of agenda prerogatives during the committee stage of the congressional 
process. Certain aspects of agenda control in committee were apparent during 
Orrin Hatch's (Repub.-Utah) chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Labor 
and Human Resources from 1981 to 1987. Hatch led a partisan majority of 
nine Republicans to seven Democrats. But the Republican majority included two 
senators-Lowell Weicker (Repub.-Connecticut) and Robert Stafford (Repub.-
Vermont)-whose policy preferences often resembled those of committee Demo-
crats. As a result, liberals had more votes on the committee than did conservatives 
like Hatch. Hatch's strategic response as chairman was to restrict the committee's 
agenda and exclude what he feared would be an avalanche of liberal initiatives-
initiatives the chairman otherwise would have been unable to defeat because he 
lacked a majority of the votes. As Hatch later recalled, "[t]here was constant 
pressure from the Democrats on the agenda, and they were very good at it to give 
them credit. ... But I controlled the agenda. As long as the Democrats wanted 
something, they had to be accommodating.' ' 69 Democrat Howard Metzenbaum 
(Dem. -Ohio), also a committee member, echoed Hatch's comments: "The chair-
man of the committee didn't have the votes to control his own committee .... 
Senator Hatch's style was to use the schedule-not putting items on the calendar, 
not pushing things. " 70 
Chairman Hatch's agenda prerogatives often had a significant impact on the 
content of committee outcomes, but evaluating the magnitude of this impact 
requires a subtle understanding of committee politics because it varied from issue 
to issue depending on the distribution of preferences in committee. 
First, there were certain issues considered in the Labor Committee during the 
Hatch chairmanship in which existing law fell between the preferences of Hatch 
and the two pivotal voters-Hatch favored moving policy to the right, while 
Stafford and Weicker favored more liberal alternatives to the status quo. The 
distribution of preferences on many labor, health, and civil rights issues resembled 
this configuration. Under these conditions the passage of conservative bills was 
not possible-the only policy changes that could muster majority support were 
movements away from Hatch's preferences toward the views of committee liberals. 
With respect to these issues, Hatch employed the rational response of closing the 
gates and denying access to the full committee agenda. For example, in 1985, 
68. The material in this section is adopted from EvANS, supra note 57. 
69. /d. at 67-68. 
70. /d. at 68. 
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Hatch resisted scheduling an initiative sponsored by ran:cing Democrat Edward 
Kennedy (Dem.-Massachusetts) which would have extended the health insurance 
coverage oflaid-off employees, widows, and divorcees. Hatch realized that liberals 
in the Labor Committee might have the votes necessary to report the legislation 
to the full Senate and he favored no action on the Kenr.edy measure. 71 
In contrast, consider the case in which the preferences of Hatch and the two 
pivotal voters supported positions to the left of existing law, with Stafford and 
Weicker favoring more liberal alternatives than did the chairman. Legislation 
considered by Weicker's Subcommittee on the Handicapped often fell into this 
category. In this instance, the chairman's response wa; to threaten to block a 
proposal if it was not modified before full committee markup. Although Hatch 
wanted legislation, simply opening the gate to these bill:: would have resulted in 
departures from existing law that were more radical than he favored. In these 
instances, the result often was a compromise amendmenc acceptable to the chair-
man. For example, in 1985, Lowell Weicker introduced legislation authorizing 
$10 million to support advocacy programs for residents of mental institutions. 
Hatch wanted to pass a bill aiding the institutionalized m!ntally ill, but he favored 
greater reliance on existing state programs. As a result, Hatch refused to schedule 
Weicker's bill for full committee consideration until ce1tain changes were made 
in the draft. After some procedural sparring, a Hatch-\Veicker compromise was 
achieved and the legislation was placed on the Labor Committee agenda and 
reported to the full Senate without opposition. 72 
The Senate Labor Committee during the Hatch chairmanship demonstrates 
why agenda practices can confound efforts to predict legislative intent on unconsid-
ered issues. Clearly, we could not have gauged the "intent" ofthe Labor Commit-
tee when its legislation was ambiguous by examining member preferences alone. 
The policy views of Stafford and Weicker best reflected the mood of panel mem-
bers, but, as we have seen, committee policy typically d.verged from their prefer-
ences toward those of Orrin Hatch because of the chairman's strategic manage-
ment of the agenda. 
But the manner in which Hatch's agenda prerogativ,!s could have affected the 
outcome of an unconsidered policy issue is not at all certain. This is particularly 
so for issues where the preferences of Hatch and the pivotal voters were to the left 
of existing law (e.g., Weicker's legislation to protect the mentally ill). Under such 
conditions, the outcome of committee deliberations wiil depend in large part on 
the bargaining advantages and skills of the relevant legislators. And, as discussed 
above, committee members can always force an item onto the agenda or offer 
legislation that has been successfully blocked in committee as an amendment to 
some other measure on the Senate floor. Circumstances c :xisted in which committee 
liberals had both the incentive and the leverage nece~sary to challenge Hatch's 
control and force their own preferences into legislation. However, it can be very 
71. In the fall of 1985, however, Kennedy was able to partially circumvent Hatch's agenda preroga· 
tives by attaching the legislation to the Labor Committee's reconciliation bill . See id. at 167-68. 
72 . ld. at 45-47 . 
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difficult to predict the variables that determine whether these and other similar 
conditions would have prevailed: factors such as the intensity of support for a 
liberal proposal in committee, the degree of support on the floor, the content of 
both liberal and conservative alternatives, and the extent of contentment with the 
status quo. Each of these factors played a key role in determining whether commit-
tee liberals would have been willing to risk a frontal challenge to Hatch, and 
whether such a challenge could have been successfully waged in committee or 
on the floor. With respect to an issue that never actually confronted committee 
mt;mbers, we cannot predict with precision how those variables ultimately would 
have played out. Therefore, it is problematic to reconstruct either the manner in 
which leadership would have influenced the outcome, or the outcome itself. 
Agenda Control on the Floor. 73 Our second case study pertains to the role of agenda 
prerogatives during floor deliberations. In 1985 the Senate considered a bill to 
reauthorize the Clean Water Act. Much of the conflict surrounding the reauthori-
zation focused on a sewage treatment grant program that provided $2.4 billion in 
federal money to local governments each year. As is often the case in Congress, 
conflict about the sewage treatment grant program focused on the issue of how to 
allocate these funds to the various states. 
In the Senate the reauthorization bill was referred to the Environment and 
Public Works Committee where the critical players were Robert Stafford of Ver-
mont (chairman), John Chafee (Repub.-Rhode Island) (subcommittee chair), 
George Mitchell of Maine (subcommittee ranking minority member), and Lloyd 
Bentsen (Dem.-Texas) (ranking minority member of the full panel). Formal action 
began when Bentsen expressed deep concerns about the new allocation formula. 
Texas had not done well under the old allotment, and he wanted to increase 
funding for his constituents. 
The political task facing committee leaders was to devise a formula that would 
benefit Texas, but also increase funding for a majority of senators in committee 
and in the full chamber so that the allotment formula as a whole could be passed. 
Although staff to Stafford, Bentsen, Chafee, and Mitchell eventually settled on a 
formula that met the necessary political criteria, a number oflarge industrial states 
were made worse off by the new numbers. 
Two of the losers, New York and Minnesota, were represented on the Environ-
ment and Public Works panel, and dissention broke out during a committee 
meeting, with Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Dem.-New York) and Dave Durenb-
erger (Rep.-Minnesota) voicing opposition. The committee leadership had the 
votes in committee, however, and the legislation containing the new allocation 
formula was reported by a 13-to-2 margin, with Moynihan and Durenberger 
casting the only nays. Unable to exert their will in the Environment and Public 
Works Committee, the Durenberger-Moynihan forces moved their battle to the 
full Senate. 
73. The following description of Senate consideration of the sewage treatment grant program during 
1985 is drawn from in-depth interviews with committee staff members who participated in the process. 
For a discussion of these interviews, see EvANS, supra note 57. 
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The sewage treatment grant issue illustrates very well th•: importance of agenda 
prerogatives on the Senate floor because there existed an in finite number of poten-
tial allotment formulas, and for each and every one it wa:; technically feasible to 
devise an alternative that would improve the relative position of a majority of 
states . Since members tended to vote for the alternative that granted their constit-
uents the largest portion of the allotment formula pie, there existed no formula 
that could not be defeated by some alternative. 
After committee action on the bill, for example, Dure:1berger and Moynihan 
responded to the committee-passed formula by devising an amendment that would 
have increased funding for a majority of states relative to the ommittee bill. However, 
compared to the formula in what was then existing law, a m<jority of states did better 
under the status quo than under the proposed Durenberger-Moynihan amendment. 
Thus, if matters had come to a vote, it was expected that (1: the committee formula 
would have defeated current law; (2) the Durenberger· Moynihan amendment 
would have defeated the committee formula; and (3) cunent law would have de-
feated the Durenberger-Moynihan amendment . This is an c:xample of the "paradox 
of voting," or "Arrow's Paradox." As a result of such dymmics, the order in which 
the alternatives were considered would determine the outcome. 74 Control over the 
agenda was critical. As one committee aide involved in the issue recalled, 
If you can manipulate the parliamentary situation so that [a particular order for consider-
ing amendments] is the choice presented, then you can just continue to roll. If you have 
the analytic capacity to do it, if you know what the factors are, [then] you know what 
the political consequences are. It's also possible to do it in such a cynical way that you 
can destroy someone who opposes you-[in a way] that just wipes out a state . We didn't 
reach that ground, but we had formulas available that coul :1 have done that. 7$ 
Party leaders in the Senate often defer to the relevartt committee leaders on 
scheduling. As a result, the committee leaders on Environment and Public Works 
expected to have more say than Durenberger or Moynihan about the order of 
consideration of the various allotment formulas on the Sc:nate floor. However, as 
mentioned above, procedural prerogatives in the Senate a:e remarkably dispersed. 
Consequentially, the Durenberger-Moynihan forces were able to respond by 
threatening to filibuster the entire reauthorization unlc:ss their interests in the 
funding criteria were somehow accommodated . 
The sewage treatment grant program was just a small part of the legislation, 
and there was considerable support in the Senate for reauthorizing the Clean 
Water Act . As a result, a meeting was held between the key senators and a 
compromise allotment formula was devised, which ther passed the Senate. The 
final agreement gave states like New York and Minneso1 a more money than they 
would have achieved under the original committee bill, but less than they would 
have received under the Durenberger-Moynihan substitute. 
74. For useful introduction to the paradox of voting and the importance of agenda control, see 
WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM (1982) and fARB'R & FRICKEY LAW AND PUBLIC 
CHOICE, supra note 16. 
75. Interview with C . L. Evans. 
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Clearly, control over the agenda was crucial to the outcome of the allotment 
formula controversy. And because procedural prerogatives are so dispersed in the 
Senate, the committee leaders, party leaders, and Durenberger and Moynihan all 
influenced the process of floor consideration to a certain extent. However, the final 
outcome was not preordained. It turned on many factors, including the degree of 
support for cloture, the potential willingness of committee leaders to risk the entire 
bill to retain their formula, the intensity of the opposition from Duren berger and 
Moynihan, and the salience of the allotment formula issue to other senators. What 
if our task was to determine how the Senate would have voted on another formula 
entirely-a formula that was not even considered? Could we reliably ascertain 
whether the tools of agenda control would have been sufficient for the committee 
leaders' preferences to defeat such an unconsidered formula? Could we reconstruct 
how the forces in support of such a formula would have used their own agenda 
resources, and whether that strategy would have been successful? 
The answers to these questions are unclear. The strategic calculations that 
govern the degree to which agenda control prerogatives are capable of influencing 
outcomes and the manner in which they do affect those outcomes vary significantly 
from issue to issue. When an entirely new policy alternative is put into the mix, 
not only do subjective policy preferences change, but also the way those preferences 
are assembled into law. As a result, the predicted outcome may bear little or no 
resemblance to the scenario that Congress may have actually followed. 
* * * * * * 
Thus, the agenda control structures that Congress has instituted are directly 
and fundamentally relevant to the issue of legislative intent. These mechanisms 
not only determine how subjective preferences are translated into policy, but also 
have the potential to result in outcomes that cannot be explained by preferences 
alone. However, as suggested by the case studies on the Senate Labor and Human 
Resources Committee and the Clean Water Act reauthorization, a court cannot 
be expected to predict with much precision the interplay of agenda prerogatives 
with policy alternatives that were not directly considered by Congress. Each of 
these examples reveals that agenda prerogatives are diffuse, and that uncertainty 
accompanies this diffusion. The amount of influence that a coalition can exert over 
outcomes is contingent on a wide array of factors, each of which varies in different 
ways with respect to different issues. Therefore, the task of reconstructing how 
Congress would have responded to an unconsidered issue is always difficult and 
often impossible. 
III. Conclusion 
Legislative intent cannot be understood by reference to policy preferences alone. 
Rather, the fundamentally majoritarian system that converts those preferences 
into law is an integral part of the concept of legislative intent. Indeed, because 
these internal structures are capable of engineering a result that is not necessarily 
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consistent with subjective member preferences, any search for legislative intent 
that disregards those structures does so at the risk of mis .nterpretation. 
In the context of "imaginative reconstruction," i.e., the effort to predict how 
Congress would have resolved an issue it did not actually consider, the necessity 
of considering congressional structure results in turmoil ar.d confusion. Although 
institutional arrangements exert a demonstrable influence over policy outcomes, 
they do so in ways that are not easily predictable. These arrangements create a 
diffuse yet irregular distribution of power in the Congres; and, as a result, how 
this power is exercised varies significantly. Therefore, it is not clear that a judicial 
or administrative interpreter can reliably reconstruct legislative intent with respect 
to unresolved issues. Also, absent compelling evidence that Congress intended a 
particular outcome, statutory interpretation can be largely a matter of guess work. 
While these assertions may not at first glance seem to s:ty much about Chevron 
and the surrounding debate over statutory interpretation, their implications are 
profound. As the examples in this article have demonstrated, congressional proce-
dures play a crucial role in determining outcomes in the legislative process. There-
fore, their relevance to the issue of legislative intent, and t1e prediction of legisla-
tive outcomes, is beyond cavil. The fact that the precise ef'ect of these procedures 
cannot be gauged means that the search for legislative int1:nt on issues not placed 
before the legislature can be akin to a wild goose chase. In this respect, Chevron 
strikes a comfortable balance between what we can predic1 and what we cannot-
a balance that is confirmed by the realities of the legislative process. 
The question remains whether courts or agencies are bt:tter suited to fill in the 
gaps left behind by Congress. The balance of powers side of the Chevron debate is 
largely about this question. Chevron supporters argue that executive agencies are 
charged with implementing statutes, and they work closely with Congress in tai-
loring statutory schemes. The executive branch is therd)re in a better position 
than the courts to answer questions to which Congress has not provided clear 
textual answers. 76 Furthermore, statutory ambiguities that require judicial re-
course to nonstatutory sources are essentially policy matters, which are in the 
purview of the agencies, rather than the courts. 77 Finally, if Congress is dissatisfied 
with agency interpretations, it may enact more specific and precise statutes. 
Chevron opponents claim that legislative ambiguity or incompleteness should not 
be equated with an affirmative act of delegation to an ag•:ncy. 78 Because there is 
76. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 1' 3 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 574-75 
(1985); Pierce, supra note 26, at 307; Richard Posner, Economics, PolitiCJ, and the Reading of Statutes and 
the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 272 (1982); Kenneth W. Starr, judicial Review in the Post-
Chevron Era, 3 YALE]. ON REG. 283, 307-10 (1986). But see Scalia, sujra note 4, at 514 ("If it is, as 
we have always believed, the constitutional duty of the courts to say what the law is, we must search 
for something beyond relative competence as a basis for ignoring that Jrinciple when agency action 
is at issue."). 
77. Diver, supra note 76, at 583-84; Pierce, supra note 26, at 307-08 Starr, supra note 76, at 308. 
But see Scalia, supra note 4, at 515. 
78. "Chevron offers no evidence to support its conclusion that silenc: or unclarity in a regulatory 
statute typically represents Congress's deliberate delegation of mean ng-elaboration power to the 
agency." Farina, supra note 6 at 470. 
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a wide variety of explanations for legislative ambiguity, 79 and because statutes are 
often deliberately vague, 80 it is inappropriate to assume that congressional silence 
is inevitably equivalent to agency delegation. 81 Chevron therefore misreads congres-
sional preferences to undermine the judicial role. 82 
It is beyond the scope of this article to settle all aspects of the Chevron dispute. 
Nonetheless, our examination of the internal structures of Congress helps clarify 
this dispute. Specifically, the critical but complex role played by congressional 
procedures and structures cautions against efforts to read tea leaves to ascertain 
nonspecified legislation objectives. Chevron's demand that Congress speak to "the 
precise question at issue" seems sensible. Whether courts or agencies should be 
the ones to flesh out legislative details is a matter we leave to the legions presently 
engaged in the Chevron battlefield. 
79. Pierce, supra note 26, at 305. 
80. Randy E. Barnett, Forward: judicial Conservatism v. A Principled judicial Activism, 10 HARV. J. L. 
& Pus. PoL'v 273, 288 (1987). 
81. See Farina, supra note 6, at 460-61: 
One need not have a deconstructionist's belief in the indeterminacy of language or a public choice 
theorist's conviction in the inevitability of statutory vagueness to appreciate that, if the court's 
independent role ends whenever ambiguity is discovered or analogy must be employed, the agency's 
judgment will virtually always control the interpretive outcome. 
See also Pierce, supra note 26, at 305 (''The general proposition that Congress cannot and does not resolve 
all the policy issues raised by its creation of a regulatory scheme probably is not at all controversial.''). 
82. Chevron opponents, moreover, argue that the decision, rather than providing incentives for 
positive institutional reform, actually raises the costs of effective government by ceding too much power 
to the executive. See FARBER & FRICKEY, LAw AND Pusuc CHOICE, supra note 16, at 92-95. See also 
Eskridge, supra note 4, at 683-84; Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, supra note 16, 
at 458-59. 
